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RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FORMALISM
AND FUNCTIONALISM IN SEPARATION OF
POWERS CASES
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.
Peter Strauss has usefully framed key debates in separation
of powers jurisprudence around the distinction between
formalist and functionalist methodologies for construing the
Constitution.' The formalist-functionalist dichotomy is an
appealing way to understand and to teach the cases, but it
masks complexities I should like to explore.
There are no fewer than three different ways that
constitutional formalism and functionalism can be contrasted.
One is their apparently different approach to legal rules and
standards.2 Formalism might be associated with bright-line
rules that seek to place determinate, readily enforceable limits
on public actors. Functionalism, at least as an antipode, might
be associated with standards or balancing tests that seek to
provide public actors with greater flexibility.
Another way of contrasting formalism and functionalism
focuses on the reasoning process by which we reach rules or
standards. Formalism might be understood as deduction from
authoritative constitutional text, structure, original intent, or all
three working together. Functionalism might be understood as
induction from constitutional policy and practice, with practice
typically being examined over time. Formalist reasoning
promises stability and continuity of analysis over time;
functionalist reasoning promises adaptability and evolution.
John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School
1. See generally Peter L Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-
Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L REV. 488 (1987); Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L REV. 573 (1984).
2 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Frank Ri Easterbrook,
Formalism, Functionalism, Ignorance, Judges, 22 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 13 (1998).
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Finally and relatedly, formalism and functionalism could be
contrasted as emphasizing different goals for law. Formalism
might be understood as giving priority to rule of law values
such as transparency, predictability, and continuity in law.
Functionalism, in turn, might be understood as emphasizing
pragmatic values like adaptability, efficacy, and justice in law.
The formalism-functionalism dichotomy is apparent even in
the rhetorical discourse about the relationship of the three, or
more, branches of the national government. "Separation of
powers" connotes relatively formalist inquiries of rules,
deductions, and sharp lines. "Checks and balances," on the
other hand, connotes relatively functionalist inquiries of
standards, inductions, and flexible interactions.
Whether understood as theories about rules, reasoning
processes, or competing jurisprudence, neither formalism nor
functionalism has wholly dominated American constitutional
history. This absence of dominance begins with the
Washington Administration, through the Marshall and Taney
Courts, through the New Deal administrative state, and into
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. 3 Indeed, some of the
canonical cases treating allocations of national and state powers
are classics in both genres. In McCulloch v. Maryland,4 perhaps
the greatest constitutional decision in our history, Chief Justice
John Marshall deduced from the text and structure-and maybe
even the original intent-of the Constitution, rules apportioning
national and state authority.5 That approach sounds formalist,
but Chief Justice Marshall also construed the text flexibly,
seizing upon the Necessary and Proper Clause6 and invoking a
constitutional policy of expansive national power.7 That
approach sounds functionalist. Like John Hart Ely, whose
representation-reinforcement theory McCulloch anticipated,
Chief Justice Marshall wove formalist and functional lines of
thinking and argumentation throughout the opinion.8
3. See Daniel A. Farber, William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, Constitutional
Law: Themesfor the Constitution s Third Century ch. 8 (2d ed. 1998).
4. 17 US. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
5. Chief Justice Marshall also did this in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187-
239 (1824).
6. U.S. CoNSr. art I, § 7, cl. 18 ("To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers").
Z See McCulloch, 17 US. at 421.
. Id. at 401-37. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DlSrRUST: A THEORY OF
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In his comments at this Conference, Judge Easterbrook
mentions the celebrated Steel Seizure Case,9 where the Supreme
Court struck down President Truman's seizure of the steel
mills as unauthorized by congressional statutes and therefore
an executive usurpation of legislative powers.iO As Judge
Easterbrook suggests, the Steel Seizure Case is therefore
exemplary of formalist reasoning." The Steel Seizure Case,
however, rests just as firmly in functionalist reasoning.
Justice Black's opinion for the Court, joined by five Justices,
deductively reasoned from the tripartite separation of powers-
the Constitution allocates all the legislative powers of the
national government to Congress and none to the President;
President Truman's seizure of the steel mills was legislative in
nature; ergo, his action was ultra vires 2 Five Justices, four of
whom joined Justice Black's opinion, wrote concurring
opinions that considered more flexible standards, induction
from experience, and pragmatic accommodation.'3 Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion, the best example, set forth a
tripartite standard for evaluating presidential action and
expressly accorded a role for considering political history,
equilibrium, and expediency.' 4 Although Justice Jackson joined
the majority opinion and spoke only for himself, it has emerged
as the most influential of the Steel Seizure Case opinions.
JUDICIAL REVIEW 88 (1980).
9. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579 (1952).
10. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 17.
11. See id.
12. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 ("In the framework of our Constitution, the
President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is
to be a lawmaker... [a]nd the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who
shall make laws which the President is to execute.").
13. See id at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It is an inadmissibly narrow
conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution
and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them."); id. at 633-34 (Douglas,
J., concurring) ("Today a kindly President uses the seizure power to effect a wage
increase and to keep the steel furnaces in production. Yet tomorrow another President
might use the same power... to regiment labor as oppressively as industry thinks it
has been regimented by this seizure."); id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The
tendency is strong to emphasize transient results upon policies such as wages or
stabilization and lose sight of the enduring consequences upon the balanced power
structure of our Republic."); 1d. at 660 (Burton, J., concurring) ("The controlling fact
here is that Congress, within its constitutionally delegated power, has prescribed for
the President specific procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in meeting the
present type of emergency."); id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring) ("[Tihe President's
independent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the
nation.").
14. See 1d. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Moreover, Justice Jackson's express willingness to allow the
legislative-executive boundary to shift through a constitutional
"adverse possession" was accepted by five Justices: Justice
Jackson himself, Justice Frankfurter concurring, and the three
dissenters. The Steel Seizure Case contains at least two distinct
majority voices, one predominantly formalist and the other
generally functionalist.
The warring majorities in the Steel Seizure Case suggest the
following thesis: along any of the dimensions I have
suggested-rules, legal reasoning, modes of thought-formalism
and functionalism are frequently and maybe typically
interconnected. They are a "both-and" inquiry, rather than an
"either-or" inquiry. Because state legitimacy depends upon
both formal rule-following and functional efficacy,
constitutional reasoning pervasively, and often unconsciously,
melds formalist and functionalist justifications.
A dramatic illustration of this thesis is a case Judge
Easterbrook invoked. The complexity of its reasoning was
suggested to me a number of years ago by Michael McConnell.
In Morrison v. Olson,'5 the Supreme Court upheld the
independent counsel statute.16 Morrison is typically taught as a
functionalist opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, prevailing
over a formalist dissent by Justice Scalia. Reading the opinions
and the commentary, however, undermines the sharpness of
these distinctions.
Consider the Chief Justice's opinion, which is considered a
functional compromise of the Constitution's distinction
between legislative and executive powers. The analysis starts
with and closely focuses on the Appointments Clause, the last
phrase of Article I1, Section 2, Clause 2, of the Constitution,
"the Congress may, by Law, vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."' 7 The
Chief Justice reasons that the independent counsel is an
"inferior" officer given her subordinate position and limited
duties and firmly rejected Olson's suggestion that the clause
should not be construed to allow appointment of prosecuting
15. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
16. Ethics in Government Act tit VI, 28 US.C §§ 49,591-99 (1994); see Morrison, 487
US. at 660.
17. US. CONSr. art. I, § 2, d. 2; see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670.
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officials outside the executive branch.18 The opinion for the
Court was, in short, saturated with formalist analysis, as it
derived a separation of powers rule from the plain
constitutional text; supported its rule by examination of
original understanding and precedent; and insisted that the
constitutional text, structure, and precedent set limits on
Congress's use of the Appointments Clause. 9
This analysis is not to say that the conventional wisdom is
wrong to view the Chief Justice's opinion in functional terms,
for the opinion stops short of developing bright-line rules for
determining exactly who is and is not an "inferior" officer
under the Appointments Clause. More important, the opinion
can be criticized as unpersuasive along the formalist lines the
Chief Justice pursues, so unpersuasive, perhaps, as to
undermine the opinion's claim to be honestly construing the
Constitution.20 Justice Scalia's merciless dissenting opinion
contributes to the impression that the Court left Congress
without either rules or even standards to create new executive
organs in the future and that the Court did so because of the
usefulness and political popularity of the independent
counsel's office.2'
With deference to Justice Scalia, whom I consider an
extraordinary analyst, the opinion for the Court made out at
least a plausible formalist case for its result. Indeed, Justice
Scalia's dissent, celebrated as a brilliant specimen of formalist
analysis, bears more than a trace of functionalist thinking in
turn.
To begin with, the dissent emphasizes functionalist reasons
for strictly enforcing the Constitution's limits. The central issue
in the case is allocation of power, Justice Scalia claims at the
outset, and if that exercise is not sharply limited, power is
18. See Morrison, 487 US. at 671-73.
19. See id, at 693 (concluding that the statute does not "interfere impermissibly with
[the Presidents] constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws"
and inquiring whether the Act, "taken as a whole, violates the principle of separation of
powers by unduly interfering with the role of the Executive Branch.").
20. Scholars have feasted on the Chief Justice's opinion like famished dieters, and
formalist criticisms have dominated the literature. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994);
Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson:- A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was
Wrong, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 313 (1989).
21. See Morrison, 487 US. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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subject to expansion and abuse. 2 Ultimately, what Justice
Scalia and his formalist allies teach is that one reason to enforce
the rules of the Constitution is the ex ante argument that, if the
Court does not enforce the rules, then Congress and the
President will behave as though there were no rules to
constrain them.23 In other words, you can have a functionalist
argument for a formalist punch line, and I think that
characterizes some of Justice Scalia's reasoning in Morrison. In
other words, you can have a formalist argument for a
functionalist punch line. The Chief Justice's opinion can be read
as supporting the proposition that when key constitutional
terms (such as "inferior officer" or "executive power") are
formally undefined and therefore left ambiguous in close cases,
the constitutional interpreter should consider pragmatic,
consequentialist arguments.
The critical debate between the Court and the dissent is the
following: Justice Scalia claimed that the independent counsel
statute invades a core "executive" duty that the Constitution
vests exclusively with the President, and the Appointments
Clause cannot be construed to derogate from that core
constitutional rule. a4 His analysis, however, of what is the core
executive power is easier to defend from a functional than a
formal perspective. For example, Professor Harold Krent has
shown in some detail that, at the time of the framing, criminal
prosecution was not dominated by the executive or controlled
by the President.25 Both private individuals and public
prosecutors, state and federal, undertook to prosecute
criminals in the 1790s, but not under any kind of hierarchical
control by either the Attorney General or the President.26
Krent's analysis does not undermine the proposition, to which
both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia would
subscribe, that criminal prosecution should be an executive
function normally controlled by the President, but it does
undermine Justice Scalia's claim that the Court's Appointments
22. See id at 699.
23. See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (invalidating Gun Free
School Zones Act, then codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988)).
24 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 703-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
From Histor, 38 AM. U. L REV. 275,286-90 (1989).
26. See id. at 286-90 (discussing Congress's refusal over time to centralize law
enforcement authority in the executive).
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Clause analysis betrayed the original understanding of the
constitutional separation of powers.
An important reason Justice Scalia's dissent appears so
persuasive today lies not in its formalist command of
constitutional text or original understanding, which have been
well-criticized, but rather in a functionalist argument which my
student John Vecchione, former President of Georgetown Law
Center's Federalist Society, once called the "Terminator
argument." That is, the independent counsel is set up like
Arnold Schwarzenegger's character in The Terminator, a movie
set in a future where machines are conquering Earth and have
developed cyborg assassins like Arnold to take out designated
humans. Like the Terminator, the independent counsel is
programmed to investigate, prosecute, and ultimately take out
a designated human being. Like the Terminator, the
independent counsel shuts down once she or he has done so.
Like the Terminator, the independent counsel is frightening
even if a possibly defensible creation.2 What is frightening is
the creation of a prosecutorial apparatus unfettered by normal
fiscal, political, and fairness limits. Justice Scalia's dissent plays
upon these libertarian fears.
Now, Morrison and the arguments I can make concerning the
majority and dissenting opinions, help us to see a broader
point-formalism and functionalism are related, perhaps as two
sides of a coin. Both formalism and functionalism appeal to our
images of proper constitutionalism. Proper constitutionalism
includes with it elements of stability and continuity of the core
rules and principles contained in the foundational document
but also contains escape hatches of flexibility to adapt to
inevitably new and changed circumstances. Typically, the
Constitution's Framers understood matters better than modem
commentators; their division of government among three
branches aimed to assure both liberty of citizens against state
tyranny, formalism, and efficacy of the state to deal with crises
and national problems, functionalism.28 The Framers did not
see such a profound gulf between form and function, and
27. In Terminator II, Arnold plays a "good" Terminator sent back in time to protect
humans from assassination by a "bad" Terminator. Draw your own constitutional or
political parallels.
28. See Suzanna Sherry, Separation of Powers: Asking a Different Question, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 287 (1989).
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neither should we today.
Thus it is that functionalists such as Peter Strauss happily
endorse the rule-of-law and stability of expectations that
formalism seeks. 29 Formalists such as Justice Scalia are just as
happy to announce that the formal Constitution can be flexibly
applied to new cases and new circumstances, as he emphasized
in his recently published Tanner lectures.30
What sensible formalists and sensible functionalists ought to
recognize, as many of them do, is that government legitimacy
is not mono-vocal; it is multi-vocal. It is an amalgam of
rule-following-formalism, rule-of-law-and political efficacy-
functionalism, flexibility. Moreover, our particular Constitution
embodies within its four corners both precepts, as exemplified
by Morrison. The Constitution does have in it many bright-line
rules, such as the division of authority: executive to the
President, judicial to the Supreme Court, and legislative to the
Congress. The Appointments Clause is an example of a
bright-line rule in the Constitution.
But the rules deployed in the Constitution typically utilize
undefined terms that must be, or inevitably will be, construed
in light of multiple constitutional policies that the Framers
refused to cabin. What, indeed, is the "executive power," which
the Framers declined to define? An "inferior officer," for the
purpose of the Appointments Clause? In independent counsel
cases, the constitutional policies are not just those of separation
of powers, not just those of checks and balances, but involve
those of due process and individual rights, as well.
Finally, consider precedent, which I have left out of the
account thus far. Precedent itself serves both formalist and
functionalist purposes and suggests the merger, or at least
relationship of the two. In Morrison, two of the major
precedents were Myers v. United States,31 which had struck
down a statute limiting presidential discretion over the
termination of post office officials, 32 and Humphrey's Executor v.
29. See, e.g., Peter L Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, in 72 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 1, at 526.
30. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE LAW 3,37-44 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
31. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
32. See Morrison, 487 US. at 686 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 US. 52, 176
(1926)).
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United States,33 which upheld the creation of a quasi-legislative
agency, the Federal Trade Commission, whose commissioners
were partially immunized from presidential terminationm
Precedent in Morrison and in other cases is formalist in setting
the Constitution's textual rules more dearly and precisely. It is
also formalist in the sense that precedent itself is a rule of law
which gives continuity and stability to constitutional
expectations. Yet, at the same time, precedent is functionalist,
because it is elastic, allowing the text to breathe and evolve in
response to new times, new problems, and new circumstances
in an incremental, common law way.
In these comments, I have aimed only to show that we ought
not consider functionalism and formalism as inevitably
antipodal, or even independent, forces of constitutional law.
Ultimately, we must appreciate how they are inextricably
related. As theories of governance, formalism cannot avoid
functional inquires, any more than functionalism can avoid
formalist lines. As bases for state legitimacy, neither formalism
nor functionalism alone is sufficient. As argumentative modes,
the formalist argument conjoined with a functional counterpart
is much stronger than either argument standing alone.
33. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
34. See id at 687-88 (citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 US. 602, 631-
32(1934)).
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